Abstract-In this modern era of digital communication even a trivial task needs to be performed over internet which is not secure. Many cryptographic algorithms existed to provide security which facilitates secure communication through internet. As these algorithms need a secret session key, it is required to interchange this key in a secure way. In two-party communication, two clients initially share a low random (entropy) password through a secure channel to establish a secret session key. But this paradigm necessitates high maintenance of passwords, since each communicating pair requires separate passwords to establish a secure session key. In three-party communication network, each communication party shares a password with the trusted third-party (server) to exchange a secret session key. The beauty of this setting is that, even a server does not know the session key. The Password Authenticated Encrypted Key Exchange (PA-EKE) protocols have attracted a lot of curiosity to authors to propose various two-party and three-party PA-EKE protocols. Security flaws in various protocols proposed by Chang-Chang, Yoon-Yoo, PSRJ and Raj et al. inspired to design a robust, computationally efficient and highly secure protocol. This paper is an attempt to propose a secure and novel Password Authenticated 3P-EKE protocol using XOR operations and analogous (parallel) message transmission. The proposed protocol is easy to design and more secured against all types of attacks like password guessing, replay, pre-play, server spoofing etc. which made this protocol special.
maintenance of passwords due to each communication pair needs a separate password to establish a secure session key. This flaw motivates the authors to propose three-party PA-EKE protocols. In password authenticated Three-Party Encrypted Key Exchange (3P-EKE) protocols, each communication party shares a low random (entropy) password in advance with the trusted third-party through a secure channel. Once this happens, any two parties who anticipate in establishing a strong session key, has to route to the trusted third-party with their shared passwords to verify each other. Subsequently, only the valid parties can be endorsed to develop the secure session key. The novelty of this setting is even a trusted third-party is not knowing the session key. This particular mechanism (3P-EKE) is extensively set up on oodles of distant user verification systems due to its easiness and suitability of maintaining a low random password at user side. Such 3P-EKE protocols can be used in applications which are light-weight and allow the users to communicate securely. But unfortunately, many of such mechanisms suffered from any one of the three types of password guessing attacks as explained by Ding & Horster [2] . A password guessing attack is nothing but learning the correct secret password by continuously trying until it is discovered by an intruder. Hence, any good PA-EKE protocol should satisfy the following security requirements: This paper is an attempt to propose a novel method for computing the session key based on XOR operations with analogous (parallel) message transmission which satisfies the above security requirements. The following sections provide a detailed summary of the procedures followed to design a novel protocol which facilitates a robust, secure and computationally efficient way of communication over internet.
II. RELATED WORK
Bellovin and Merrit (1992) have proved that passwordbased authenticated protocols are secure against password guessing attacks [3] . Later, various authors have proposed many two-party password authenticated key exchange (2PAKE) protocols. Due to shortfalls, 2PAKE protocols are found only suitable for client-server architecture, which motivates research community to encompass 2PAKE protocols into 3PAKE schemes for three-party communication environment. Chang et al. (2004) [4] proposed an efficient threeparty encrypted key exchange protocol (ECC-3PEKE) with both round and computation efficiencies. However, unfortunately, an undetectable online password guessing attack has been notified on ECC-3PEKE protocol by Yoon et al. (2008) [5] . At the same time they have also proposed an improvement over ECC-3PEKE protocol and claimed that the proposed protocol defends against undetectable online dictionary attacks. Also in the same year Chung et al. (2008) [6] has shown three weaknesses in a simple three-party key exchange protocol. Later, Padmavathy et al. (2009) [7] have proposed some improvement over the ECC-3PEKE protocol and claimed that the proposed protocol (PSRJ Protocol) is secure against undetectable online dictionary attacks and also achieves better performance, which requires only 4 message transmission rounds. Later, Chang et.al (2009) [8] specified the insecurity of Yoon-Yoo's Protocol and R. Padmavathy (2010) [9] has notified an undetectable online dictionary attack on PSRJ protocol. Additionally, to overcome an attack, she proposed an enhancement over the existing protocol with reduced modular exponentiation operations. In connection with this, Shirisha Tallapally (2010) [10] has proposed an impersonation attack on ECC-3PEKE protocol. Later, Archana et al. (2012) [11] has cryptanalyzed the PSRJ protocol which forms a basis for this paper. In the same year, Raj et al. [12] proposed Security Enhancement for 3-PEKE protocol using parallel Message transmission. Later, Raj et al. (2013) [13] has discussed the performance analysis of 3P-EKE protocol using parallel message transmission technique. But unfortunately, Archana et.al (2013) [14] have notified the weakness of 3P-EKE Protocol proposed by Raj et.al (2013) .
The list of notations and their descriptions used throughout this paper are illustrated in Table 1 . The protocols discussed in this paper assume that the passwords Pwd a (Alice) and Pwd b (Bob) should initially be shared with trusted party through a secured channel. 
A. Analysis of PSRJ Protocol
As required, the PSRJ protocol has been reviewed and then cryptanalyzed by showing its vulnerability to online detectable dictionary attacks.
Review
In this section, we review the PSRJ protocol. The details of the protocol can be described as follows:
Step 
Attack
This section endeavors to demonstrate the detectable online password guessing attack on PSRJ 3P-EKE protocol. The details of attack are shown below.
Step 2: An invader Carol guesses Alice's password as Pwd a' by intercepting the message i.e.{(Id a , Id b , Id t , E pwda (M a ),h t (r a ), f Kat (M a ))} and decrypts E pwda' (M a ) & to get M a' . Now attacker computes K at' =M a' rc' mod p by generating her random number r c' and sends {Id a , Id b , Id t , E pwda (M a ), h t (r c ' ), f Kat' (M a' )} to Trusted Party.
i.e., Carol sends Trusted Party: {Id a , Id b , Id t , E pwda (M a ), h t (r c ' ), f Kat' (M a' )}
Step 3: The Trusted Party decrypts E pwda (M a ) to get M a and retrieves r c' from h t (r c ' ) by using trapdoor [15] , after receiving the credentials {Id a , Id b , Id t , E pwda (M a ), h t (r c' ), f Kat' (M a' )} from the attacker Carol. Now Trusted Party computes K at' =M a' rc' mod p to authenticate the received f Kat' (M a' ). If both f Kat (M a ) and f Kat' (M a' ) are equal then the guessed password by Carol is correct and Trusted Party will continue with the remaining procedure of the protocol by assuming that he is in a secured zone.
If both f Kat (M a ) and f Kat' (M a' ) are not equal, it means that the attack is detected by Trusted Party and Trusted Party terminates this protocol at current session. An intruder never sits indolent. After some time Carol repeats the same process. She will continue the same process until she hits with the successful password.
In this way a malevolent user can copycat the actual user by getting the secrete session key successfully. 
B. Analysis of Raj et al. Protocol
This section devotes to review the Raj et al. protocol and then cryptanalyze the protocol by showing the detectable online dictionary attack.
Review
The detailed explanation is given below:
Step 2: After receiving the messages sent from users Alice and Bob, Trusted Party utilizes a trapdoor to obtain i.e., Alice  Bob: f SK (Id a , SK).
Step Otherwise, the protocol will be terminated. invader Carol can copycat Alice and connect with Bob. While Bob is thinking that it is talking with Alice but actually it is talking with the invader Carol. The details of attack are as follows:
Step 3: Trusted Party decrypts E Pwda' (K at' M a' ) to get (K at' M a' ) and also retrieves (M a' Id a ) from h t (M a' Id a ) by using trapdoor after receiving the credentials {Id a, Id b, Id t, E Pwda' (K at' M a' ), h t (M a' Id a ), f Kat' (M a' )} from an attacker Carol and computes M a'' =( M a' Id a )Id a to obtain K at'' = K at' M a'  M a''. Now Trusted Party verifies whether computed f Kat'' (M a'' ) and received f Kat' (M a' ) are equal or not. If both f Kat'' (M a'' ) & f Kat' (M a' ) are equal then the guessed password is right and Trusted Party will continue with the remaining procedure of the protocol by assuming that he is in secured zone. In this way an attacker Carol may succeed in her attempt to attack. If both f Kat'' (M a'' ) and f Kat' (M a' ) are not equal, then the attack can be detected by Trusted Party. And the Trusted Party terminates the protocol for current session. An intruder never sits idle. After some time she repeats the same process. She will continue this until she hits the successful password. In this way a malicious user can impersonate the actual user by getting the secrete session key successfully. Fig 4 illustrates the detectable online password guessing attack on Raj et al. protocol.
IV. PROPOSED PASSWORD AUTHENTICATED 3P-EKE PROTOCOL
In order to disregard the detectable online password guessing attacks, this paper endeavors to propose a secure Three-Party Encrypted Key Exchange (3P-EKE) Protocol based on XOR operation with analogous (parallel) message transmission. By using XOR operator and analogous message transmission, the proposed protocol makes it highly secure and improve the efficiency of transmission round. The detailed procedure of the proposed protocol is described in different steps as follows:
Step Step 3: After receiving the messages sent from Alice and Bob, Trusted Party utilizes a trapdoor [15] 
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
After careful revision and implementation of the proposed protocol, it is understood that the protocol is not only secure but highly efficient and also meets the given security requirements. The detailed analysis is presented in the following sections.
A. Security Analysis
The security analysis has shown that the proposed protocol is secure and robust to face any kind of possible password guessing attacks. The proposed protocol has successfully demonstrated its capabilities by meeting the necessary security requirements as follows: An attacker may try to mount off-line password guessing attack to guess the password. She intercepts {E Pwda (M a r a ), h t (Pwd a M a ), f Kat (M a )} and may guess a password, extracts M a r a , but it is impossible for her to get M a until trapdoor is known, which is known only to Trusted Party. This implies that she cannot verify the hash value f Kat (M a ). Hence, offline password guessing attack on the proposed protocol is impossible.
Attack Situation 4: Carol wants to get the session key SK.
Carol may want to get the session key SK agreeing to either f SK (Id a , SK) or f SK (Id b , SK). However, this approach cannot work, since it is very hard to retrieve a number according to the hashed value returned by the hash function.
Similarly, there might be a case that, an intruder Carol still cannot get the session key SK by impersonating the Alice/Bob or analyzing the transmitted data because of the same reasons mentioned already.
Trivial Attack
An attacker Carol may directly try to compute the session key from M a REt or M b REt . However, due to the one-way hash function and the intractability of the Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP), the trivial attack is not possible on the proposed protocol.
Pre-play attacks
An intruder Carol may impersonate Alice to cheat Bob to get the essential information for making Bob convinced that Carol is Alice. However, Carol cannot succeed, since Pwd a & Pwd b are unknown to it. Hence, she will encounter the same difficulties as already mentioned.
Replay Attacks
Suppose that Carol intercepts the message {Id a , Id b , Id t , E Pwda (M a r a ), h t (Pwd a M a ),f Kat (M a )} send by Alice to cheat Trusted Party. Carol cannot cheat trusted party, because Alice chooses a random number r a whenever Alice wants to communicate with Bob to perform the password authenticated key exchange protocol. If an attacker Carol just sends {Id a , Id b , Id t , E Pwda (M a r a ), h t (Pwd a M a ), f Kat (M a )}, then Trusted Party will detect the attack easily, since Pwd a 's & r a 's are different all the time. Consequently, an intruder Carol cannot perform replay attacks successfully.
Man-in-the-middle Attack
Suppose the attacker Carol frames her own message i.e. {E Pwdc (M c r c ), h t (Pwd c M c ), f Kct (M c )} with the guessed password Pwd c and sends it to trusted party. The trusted party will decrypt E Pwdc (M c r c ) to get (M c r c )' and obtains ‗Pwd c M c ' from h t (Pwd c M c ). Hence carol in the middle cannot obtain the correct M c until its guessed password is correct. Finally, Trusted Party computes hash value which will not match with the received hash value. Hence the protocol gets terminated by not allowing manin-the-middle to mount any attack.
Server Spoofing
The trusted party computes f Kat REt )}, then in order to obtain the session key, she should know RE b or RE a . The session keys generated in different sessions are independent, since RE a and RE b are randomly chosen by Alice and Bob, respectively. This indicates that Carol cannot obtain previous session keys even if she obtains the session key used in this run.
Known-Key Security
The proposed protocol assumes that, RE a and RE b are randomly chosen by Alice and Bob and are independent among protocol executions. This leads to the invulnerability of Known-Key security.
B. Performance Analysis
The development of an efficient protocol should take the number of transmission rounds and the computation complexity into account. The proposed protocol requires four message transmission rounds. Table 2 Table 2 demonstrates the comparison between different types of attacks such as Chang-Chang's, Yoon-Yoo's, PSRJ, Raj et.al protocols as against the proposed password authenticated 3P-EKE protocol. From the table it can be noticed that the proposed protocol is invulnerable to various attacks as mentioned earlier. endeavors to propose a robust, computationally efficient and highly secure password authenticated 3P-EKE Protocol using XOR operations with analogous message transmission. Subsequent review and successful implementation of the proposed protocol has demonstrated its invulnerability to all three types of attacks proposed by Ding & Horster [1] . The proposed protocol also proved that it is not only secured against the attacks proposed by D&H but also secure against all types of attacks such as offline attacks, Replay attacks, Pre-play attacks, Server spoofing, Man-in-middle attack and Trivial attacks. The results show that the proposed protocol is robust, highly secure, efficient and practical for implementation.
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